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NOTES

plates that actual damages can be reduced.25 Although mitigation of
damages has been criticized as having the same thoretical objections
as allowing the provocation as a full defense,26 article 2323 of the Civil
of the actions of an injured party
Code does authorize an examination
27
in the computation of damages.
In the instant case, the court made clear that one who commits
assault or battery cannot justify his tort by pointing to the words of
the victim as provocation. It is unfortunate that the court did not use
this opportunity to repudiate the aggressor doctrine in its entirety.
The doctrine is inconsistent with traditional notions of assault, battery, and privilege, 2 and no clear authority exists for it in Louisiana
law. A repudiation of the doctrine would not do violence to civilian
principles. The basis of tort liability in Louisiana is the invasion of
legally protected interests, just as it is at common law. 21 Our law
would be well served by completely rejecting the aggressor doctrine
and replacing it with a consistent inquiry into the scope of duties
imposed and privileges granted.
Terrence George O'Brien

WHO Is AN EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE?

Louisiana's workmen's compensation law provides that an injured employee may maintain a suit for damages against a "third
person" other than the employer without affecting his right to receive
25. In the instant case, the court found the words insufficient to merit any
mitigation.
26. Note, 13 NOTRE DAME LAW. 332 (1938).
27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323: "The damage caused is not always estimated at the
exact value of the thing destroyed or injured; it may be reduced according to circumstances, if the owner . . . has exposed it imprudently." For a discussion of this article
as authority for a doctrine of comparative fault see Malone, Comparative Negligence-Louisiana'sForgotten Heritage, 6 LA. L. REV. 125 (1945).
28. The relevance of such traditional considerations as the presence of a "coolingoff"' period or the use of excessive force is also questionable under the aggressor doctrine. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Torts,

26 LA. L. REV. 459, 517 (1966).
29. Professor Stone has written: "The end of the law of tort consists in the production and maintenance of a harmonious balance among the conflicting forces and interests of society, and in the affording and protection of an opportunity to all members
of the community to realize the maximum of liberty which is consonant with the best
interest of that society of which they are a part." Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana:
The Materials for the Decision of a Case, 17 TUL. L. REV. 159 (1942).
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compensation.' Included within this category of "third persons" are
executive officers of corporate employers2 and co-employees.
In addition to workmen's compensation insurance, most employers carry public liability insurance.4 There are various types of this
insurance available to the employer,' most of which cover executive
officers under the standard clause:
[Tjhe unqualified word "insured" includes the named insured and also includes any executive officer, director or stockholder thereof while acting within the scope of his duties as such
Employees are not ordinarily covered under such clauses and as a
result, many third party suits brought against the alleged insurer
under Louisiana's direct action statute7 raise the question of who is
an executive officer.
This issue was first raised in Bruce v. Travelers Insurance Co.,'
where the court held that a drilling foreman of Gulf Refining Co. was
not an executive officer. The court reasoned that its decision resulted
from a "correct reading of the intention of Gulf and Travelers as they
expressed their intention in their insurance agreement . . . ."I and
concluded that "[tihe best place to look for evidence of that inten1. LA. R.S. 23:1101 (1950).
2. Boudreaux v. Falco, 215 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); Adams v. Fidelity
and Cas. Co., 107 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
Attempts to bring individual partners of a partnership within the classification of
a third party have failed, and the individual partner is not now considered a third party
amenable to suit in tort by the employee of the partnership. Bersuder v. N.O. Pub.
Serv., 273 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Cockerham v. Consolidated Und., 262
So. 2d 119 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 262 La. 315, 263 So. 2d 49 (1972); Leger v.
Townsend, 257 So. 2d 761 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 261 La. 464, 259 So. 2d
914 (1972).
3. Vidrine v. Soileau, 38 So. 2d 77 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948); Kembro v. Holladay,
154 So. 369 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
4. R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 10.01, at 10-2 (1973).
5. These include Comprehensive General Liability Insurance affording broad coverage; Owners, Landlord's and Tenants' Liability Insurance covering the owner or
operator of premises; Manufacturers' and Contractors' Insurance covering manufacturing or contracting operations; and Storekeepers' Liability Insurance, similar to
Owner's Landlords' and Tenants' insurance but designed for the smaller retail store.

See, W.

RODDA, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE

384-92 (1966).

6. R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 10.01, at 10-2 (1973). (Emphasis
added.)
7. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1962. No. 471 § 1.
8. 266 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1959).
9. Id. at 785.
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tion was in Gulf's charter and bylaws defining and denominating
officers."'" Since the drilling foreman was not listed as an executive
officer," the court held that he was not within the coverage afforded
executive officers.
In subsequent decisions involving corporate employers, courts
followed the procedure established by Bruce.'3 Thus, it appeared settled that the courts would look to the corporate charter and by-laws
to determine executive officer status. However, the Fifth Circuit departed from that practice in Guillory v. Aetna Insurance Co.14 That
case involved a "thinly capitalized corporation which issued no capital stock, owned no property, kept no minutes, [and] had no by-laws
... II"The alleged executive officer who was employed to supervise
the corporation's only job contract was never formally designated an
officer but was given authority by the majority shareholder to write
10. Id.
11. The corporate charter designated the normal corporate officers and provided
that the board of directors could appoint other officers. The by-laws also provided that
the president of the corporation shall be the " 'chief executive officer' of the corporation." 266 F.2d 781, 784 (5th Cir. 1959).
12. In Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. v. Upham, 150 So. 2d 595 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1963), the court had a unique problem concerning executive officer coverage.
The court first had to decide if the extended coverage of executive officers was limited
only to corporations or was also applicable to a sole proprietorship. The insurer made
the logical argument that the term "executive officer" when read with the entire
standard clause applied to corporations only. The court disagreed, reasoning that it
was "conceivable that ... an unincorporated business . . . could have an executive
officer . . ." and proceeded to answer the question of whether a carpenter-foreman
could be an executive officer. Id. at 596. Examining the relationship of the individual
to his employer and finding that he had "no managerial authority nor anything to do
with the operation of his employer's business, save in the capacity of workman...
the court held that he was not an executive officer. Id. at 597.
13. In Grant v. Sutorbuilt Corp., 343 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), the
general manager of a corporation was not an executive officer since he was not an
elected official and had no authority to sign checks. Likewise, an oilfield engineer and
a shop foreman were not executive officers where neither "held a position or office
created by the corporate charter .... " Thibodeaux v. Parks Equip. Co., 185 So. 2d
232, 247 (La. App. 1st Cir.) (original hearing), writs refused, 249 La. 194, 186 So. 2d
157 (1966). In another case the Fifth Circuit held that a job superintendent and a pipe
foreman were not executive officers stating that "[tlhe decision depends on the coverage afforded by the terms of the insurance agreement between [the corporation] and
the [insurer] and both the insurer's and the insured's intention as expressed in the
agreement. [The corporation's] intentions are found in its charter and by-laws. These
documents clearly show that [the job superintendent] and [the pipe foreman] were
not 'executive officers'." Lemmons v. Zurich Ins. Co., 403 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1968).
(Emphasis added.)
14. 415 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1969).
15. Id. at 651.
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checks and negotiate contracts for the corporation. In sustaining a
jury finding that the supervisor was an executive officer, the court did
not limit the jury to an examination of the corporate charter and bylaws. The court concluded that "normal corporate formalities were
not decisive in determining whether [an individual] was an executive officer within the meaning of the insurance contract."'" Thus it
was proper for the jury to examine the individual's responsibilities
and his relationship to the corporate officers. Bruce was distinguished
on the grounds that Guillory involved a small corporation that took
no action to designate executive officers and the alleged officer in
Guillory had considerably more managerial authority than the alleged officer in Bruce. As additional support the court added that the
term "executive officer" was ambiguous and should be interpreted
against the insurer.7
In Berry v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.'" the Louisiana Second Circuit found that the manager of the Shreveport plant of
Libbey-Owens Ford Glass Co. was an executive officer since he "was
directly under a corporate officer . . . and participated in the formulation and execution of company policy . . . at the Shreveport
plant."'" It also found that the safety director of the entire company
was an executive officer because he was responsible "for the safety
of all the hourly employees of the corporation generally, and his position [was] one closely connected with the officers of the corporation." 2" It did not appear that the court made any attempt to refer to
16. Id. at 653.
17. This seems to be in conflict with the language in Bruce v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
266 F.2d 781, 784 (5th Cir. 1959) (referring to the executive officer clause): "Paragraph
32 of the by-laws provides that the president of the corporation shall be the 'chief
executive officer' of the corporation.
"This language is free from ambiguity. The intention of these provisions of the bylaws is clearly to allow the corporation to determine for itself what persons shall be
officers and how they shall be chosen. ...
"... Insurance policies should be construed liberally, but the words of a policy
must be given the meaning they ordinarily bear. 'No strained or unusual construction
should be given to any of the terms of a policy of insurance, in favor of the insurer or
of the insured.' Or, we add, in favor of a third party claimant." Id. at 784. (Citations
omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Also in Lemmons v. Zurich Ins. Co., 403 F.2d 512 (5th
Cir. 1968), the court had no difficulty in defining who was an executive officer since
the corporate charter and by-laws clearly showed this. See note 14 supra.
18. 240 So. 2d 243 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 256 La. 914, 240 So. 2d 374
(1970).
19. Id. at 246.
20. Id.
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the charter and by-laws to determine the parties' intent, thus applying the procedure of Guillory to large corporations."
An examination of the corporate charter and by-laws need not
be decisive in determining whether an individual is an executive
officer. However, the practice should not be abandoned by the courts
as appears to have been done in Berry. The issue of executive officer
status has its origin in the insurance contract and the court is only
called upon to determine the intent of the parties. If one of the parties
has taken action to express that intent-for example, by designating
executive officers in the corporate charter and by-laws-the court
should utilize this in deciding the issue. However, if there are no
executive officers designated only then should the cburt examine the
responsibilities of the "managerial employees" and their relationship
to the corporate officers. Taken in the context of the entire clause,"
the term "executive officer" seems to relate to an individual easily
associated with the corporate entity and having broad overall authority in corporate affairs. Thus the duties and responsibilities of these
"managerial employees" should resemble those of a "corporate officer" as closely as possible. His responsibilities should include participation in the formulation of company policy and his authority should
extend company wide. However, this analysis should be used to determine, not defeat, the intent of the contracting parties.
Danny Lirette

RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND UNEXPLAINED INJURIES TO ANESTHETIZED

PATIENTS

Plaintiff sustained unexplained burn injuries to his thigh and
reproductive organs while under the effects of anesthesia for an elbow
operation. Suit was brought against the hospital and the surgeon as
individual defendants. Not knowing the cause of these injuries, plaintiff urged that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable. In
21. In Spillers v. Northern Assurance Co. of America, 254 So. 2d 125 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1971), the last case involving the issue, the court apparently did not regard the
charter and by-laws as in Guillory and Berry, holding that a carpenter and a superintendent of construction were not executive officers because they had no managerial
responsibility for the affairs of the corporation generally. This process seems to have
been employed by other jurisdictions in at least two instances. Graven v. Pass, 355
F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1966) (foreman of underground mining is not an executive officer);
U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Warhurst, 336 F. Supp. 1190 (W.D. Ala. 1971) (department foreman not an executive officer).
22. See text at note 6 supra.

